God’s Image as the Foundation for Human Rights

If humans do not uniquely bear God’s image, are we uniquely valuable?

by Patricia Engler on January 25, 2023
Featured in Answers in Depth

The existence of human rights, or prima facie1 entitlements2 applying to all persons on account of their humanity, is often treated as a basic assumption in ethics, law, and justice.3 Many ethical dilemmas concern conflicting claims to rights, and voices on both sides of major controversies like abortion frequently frame their arguments in terms of rights.4 But all this discourse is meaningless unless the rights referred to are grounded in a meaningful foundation. If such a foundation exists and is knowable, then we can understand which rights exist, which rights take precedence, and how to resolve controversies surrounding rights. But where can we find this foundation?

The following analysis argues that the biblical doctrine of the imago Dei, unlike the secular anthropologies of Western popular culture, establishes a meaningful foundation for the existence, protection, and application of human rights. Building this case will require investigating biblical teachings about the imago Dei, examining theological interpretations of the image, and demonstrating that God’s image marks all humans at all times. A comparison of biblical and secular frameworks for human rights will then reveal that a biblical—but not a secular—worldview provides a robust foundation for the theory and practice of human rights in the public square.

Rights, Genesis, and the Imago Dei

A biblical examination of human rights must begin with Genesis, for as Christian legal scholar John Warwick Montgomery observed, “The significance of the biblical doctrine of creation for human rights cannot be exaggerated.”5 Scripture first mentions humans in Genesis 1:26–27, which repeatedly refers to humans as being made in God’s image. While Genesis does not specify what God’s image is, this repetition leaves no ambiguity about the image’s significance.

Genesis also indicates that the imago Dei applies distinctly to humans,6 to whom God gave dominion over earthly creation.7 Tragically, human rebellion corrupted God’s very good creation. Various theologians speculate that humanity’s fall significantly damaged the imago Dei;8 however, C. Ben Mitchell et al. observe that Scripture never suggests God’s image itself is vulnerable to being compromised.9 In fact, later Scriptures affirm that even post-fall, the imago Dei endows humans with inherent dignity,10 rights, and responsibilities.

For instance, while Genesis 9:2–5 specifies that humans could kill animals for food after the global flood of Noah’s day, Genesis 9:6 states, “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for God made man in his own image.” The imago Dei thus imbues a strong prima facie obligation not to kill fellow humans. In other words, given the relationship between obligations and rights,11 innocent humans have a prima facie right not to be killed by other persons. James 3:9 reemphasizes the image’s post-fall implications, confronting the practice of cursing humans “who are made in the likeness of God.” This passage echoes Jesus’ teaching that angrily insulting others is as much a sin as murder.12, 13 In both cases, an affront to a person represents an affront to the Creator whose image the person bears.

Other scriptures also refer to God’s image, but in a different manner. According to Mitchell et al.’s framework for distinguishing between biblical usages of imago Dei terminology, Genesis and James refer to the imago Dei as a status denoting who humans are, while other New Testament passages speak of God’s image as a standard for how humans should live.14 These authors explain, “The standard is what God intends the believer to be (Eph. 4:24) and be conformed to (Rom. 8:29)—it is the goal of the renewal (Col. 3:10) and transformation (2 Cor. 3:18) that a believer is experiencing.”15

Jesus, whom Colossians 1:15 describes as “the image of the invisible God,” fulfilled the standard of image-bearing to perfection. Jesus also adopted the status of an image-bearer, taking on human nature while remaining the God whose image humanity bears. As both God and God’s image-bearer, Jesus alone could sacrificially atone for Adam’s descendants, restoring the relationship between God and his redeemed image-bearers. The redeemed will partake in the fullness of the imago Dei as a standard; however, Scripture does not place qualifications on the imago Dei as a status, with all its associated rights.16

Theological Interpretations of the Imago Dei

Even so, theologians may inadvertently add conditions to these rights by interpreting the imago Dei in certain ways. Three main interpretations of the imago Dei are the substantive view, the functional view, and the relational view.17

The substantive view sees the image as rooted in the ontology, or essential nature, of humanity: humans are image-bearers. Some advocates for this perspective have tried locating God’s image in capacities such as reason, self-awareness, or moral decision-making.18 Others, like Mitchell et al., view the image as a possessed status that need not consist in one or more expressed trait(s).19

The functional view, however, sees the image as primarily a task which humans are called to perform: humans do image-bearing. This task is usually considered in connection with God’s mandate for humans to exercise dominion over creation, reminiscent of how ancient kings would erect statues of themselves to symbolize their authority.20 Some interpreters further link this image-bearing task to reproduction, noting that part of humans’ calling is to “be fruitful and multiply” (Genesis 1:28).21

In contrast, the relational view locates God’s image in the dynamics of humans’ relationships with God and others.

How do these interpretations matter for human rights? Because the imago Dei is the grounds for humans’ obligations not to murder (Genesis 9:6) or curse (James 3:9). Interpretations which exclude certain individuals from the imago Dei exclude these individuals from the image’s corresponding rights. A biblically and logically sound interpretation of the imago Dei is therefore essential for Christian ethical and legal engagement—not to mention, for everyday interactions with others.

Such an interpretation must meet several criteria. For instance, the interpretation must presumably view God’s image as (1) unique to humans,22 (2) reflective of God, and (3) consistently evident in the life of Christ. Furthermore, the interpretation must (4) align with Scripture’s statements and (5) not conflict with biblically derived ethical values. Criterion 1 rules out grounding the image in traits—including reason, self-awareness, communication, spirituality, emotion, or moral decision-making, which are also evident in angels.23 This first criterion also rules out perspectives that try applying the imago Dei to non-humans.24 Criterion 2, meanwhile, eliminates locating the image solely in humans’ material bodies, as the Creator was not a material body.25 Criterion 3 precludes grounding the image in elements which were never part of Jesus’ life (like being fruitful and multiplying) or were not always visible in Jesus (like the capacity for reason, which Jesus did not humanly possess as an embryo despite being recognizable as Savior before birth).26 Criterion 4 highlights exegetical issues with certain views. For instance, Genesis 1:26 indicates that God referred to making humankind in his image before referring to humans’ dominion over creation, posing difficulties for arguments that the image consists in exercising dominion.27 Finally, Criterion 5 reveals significant problems with perspectives that do not view God’s image as indelibly associated with all humans at all times.

Specifically, equating the imago Dei with the ability to perform certain tasks or express certain traits28 entails that a person who cannot perform the task or express the trait is not an image-bearer and does not possess an image-bearer’s rights. Claims that the imago Dei consists in being rational, exercising dominion, relating to other persons, or being fruitful and multiplying exclude entire categories of humans—whether the preborn, infertile couples, or persons with certain disabilities—from being image-bearers. If such claims were true, the imago Dei and its rights would be matters of degree.29 Some humans would bear God’s image less than others. Individuals would exhibit varying levels of image-bearing throughout life. Everyone would be one accident or diagnosis away from losing their image-bearing capability (or status) and its associated protections. An argument could even be attempted that because Genesis 9:2–6 permits consuming animals but not image-bearers, humans who are “not image-bearing” qualify as literal free game.

For all these reasons, the image must be inseparable from every human’s essence, as Scripture itself suggests.30 While humans have unique callings, capacities, and capabilities reflecting our image-bearing nature, God’s image does not consist in humans’ expression of these elements. We exercise dominion, relate to others, and exhibit certain faculties because we are image-bearers—not the other way around.31 Because all humans are made in God’s image, all humans possess the rights of image-bearers.

This view is consistent with Scripture’s recurrent indications that all humans have inherent value, as evidenced in Jesus’ life and teachings. For instance, in a cultural context which marginalized women, children, and persons with disabilities, Jesus’ interactions with those his society deemed least valuable personified God’s love for his image-bearers.32 Similarly, Scripture reveals that all humans—men and women, poor and wealthy, children and eunuchs, and people of every nation—can be conformed through Christ to the standard of God’s image.33 So, all humans by nature possess the status of the image. Not even death can efface this status or its rights. For instance, the martyrs in Revelation 5:9–11, despite being dead, could claim entitlement to justice for their Genesis 9:6 rights having been violated. Ultimately, a biblical worldview esteems all humans, regardless of age, sex, ability, ethnicity, or the presence of a heartbeat, as bearers of the imago Dei—and thus, as inestimably valuable.

A Biblical View and Human Rights

This biblical view of humans as created in God’s image—and as morally accountable to God, who reveals truth through his Word—provides an unchanging foundation for the existence, interpretation, and enforcement of human rights.34

This biblical view of humans as created in God’s image—and as morally accountable to God, who reveals truth through his Word—provides an unchanging foundation for the existence, interpretation, and enforcement of human rights.34 But what specific rights can be derived from Scripture? As noted above, the rights-imbuing obligations which God’s Word explicitly links to the imago Dei preclude killing and cursing humans. Christ-followers are not even to curse violators of their image-bearing rights, for Jesus admonished believers to bless their persecutors.35 Jesus himself, who could claim every right of God and man, sacrificed his rights for others’ sakes in obedience to God.36 Scripture then, seems to portray rights less as a means for asserting self-interested demands and more as grounds for protecting the interests of others.37 Human rights arise primarily from horizontal responsibilities rooted in vertical realities.

Along with the rights overtly rooted in the imago Dei, additional rights can be derived from morals communicated elsewhere throughout Scripture. For example, the Decalogue (Ten Commandments) mandates against thievery, working—and forcing employees to work—during Sabbaths,38 and dishonoring parents. Thus, image-bearers possess basic entitlements to property,39 Sabbath rests, and respect from offspring.40 Such mandates specify additional obligations to various image-bearers—to neighbors as neighbors, to the vulnerable as vulnerable, to believers as believers, and to family as family.41

Many of these biblically derived rights overlap significantly with those proposed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Rene Cassin, who drafted the Declaration,42 observed that, while the Declaration’s authors did not intentionally draw on the Decalogue, “the relationship between the two [documents] has generally been confirmed.”43 A main difference is that the Decalogue frames its statements as prescriptive duties, while the Declaration frames its statements as descriptive entitlements.44 Cassin notes that this difference is significant because Scripture’s emphasis on duties highlights human responsibilities to God,45 whereas secular statements assert “rights” as solely human elements.46 Cassin also observes that an awareness of human dignity, on which rights depend, is characterized by the statement that God created humans in his image.47 Ultimately, while Scripture does not directly spell out the specifics of all human rights, a biblical worldview provides the conceptual foundation from which such rights can be derived.

A Secular View and Human Rights

In contrast, secularism can provide no ultimate foundation for human rights. Because secularism asserts that humans evolved apart from God, humans can look to no authority higher than themselves. This creates the dichotomy which Yale law professor Arthur Leff described, wherein either a powerful collective agency (or individual) assumes the authority for truth, resulting in some form of totalitarianism, or individuals become their own authorities, resulting in polytheism.48,49 Leff notes that neither case provides sustainable grounds for rights. In the former, rights are arbitrary dispensations; in the latter, the absolute rights of every person engender irresolvable conflicts.50

The latter scenario corresponds to Western society’s expressive individualism, which views each person as his or her own authority for truth. In a landmark case solidifying abortion “rights,” the US Supreme Court summarized this view by asserting, “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”51 This outlook grants humans the “right” to be their own deities, creating their own truths, destinies, and identities. But as Leff realized, consistent polytheism is untenable.52 Some individuals must be more authoritative than others.

O. Carter Snead observes that individualistic societies bestow this authority on the persons most able to pursue individualism’s ideals, meaning that “rights” extend most fully to the humans best able to assert them.53 Thus, women can assert individualistic “rights” to abortion as superseding any rights of preborn humans. This secular view of rights drastically differs from a biblical view, which not only ascribes rights to all image-bearers, but also establishes obligations for protecting vulnerable humans who cannot defend their rights.54

Also unlike Christianity, secularism cannot provide moral content for defining or upholding rights.55 Without a God whose character is the source of truth and goodness and who reveals truth and goodness through his Word, humans have no ultimate standard for knowing what truth and goodness are.56 Attempts to ground morality in concepts like “doing no harm” or “promoting wellbeing” fall short for lack of an external, authoritative, overarching framework to show why harm is bad but wellbeing is good, to prohibit these standards from shifting, and to explain why humanity should adhere to them. Secularists can certainly behave in moral ways, but they lack a philosophical foundation for that morality, and therefore, for ethics, justice, and rights.57 Neither can rights subsist as their own moral foundations, as external standards are needed to formulate and evaluate frameworks for rights.58

Besides, immaterial rights cannot ultimately exist or be meaningful within secularism, which excludes the immaterial and precludes ultimate meaning. Even if meaningful rights could exist, secularism’s naturalistic evolutionary framework provides no basis for valuing humans above other species.59,60 Furthermore, humans, if it is assumed they evolved naturalistically, can have no unique, static nature corresponding to unique, static dignity and rights.61 Secularism, overall, can only offer arbitrary rights based on arbitrary moral assertions. And arbitrary rights can change arbitrarily. All society needs is a sufficiently loud voice broadcasting sufficiently persuasive rhetoric to turn whatever tides of consensus shape the definitions and distributions of rights. Examples of this effect abound in the twentieth century travesties to which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights responded.

Can statements like the Universal Declaration offer ultimate grounds and protection for human rights? Unfortunately, no. Eberhard Welty notes that a right does not necessarily exist simply because humans agree it must.62 The declared rights are still founded in the shifting sands of human assertion; moreover, a person—or nation—could avoid culpability for rights violations by not signing the declaration.63 But declaration-based approaches are not alone in their insufficiency. Montgomery observes that, of all the major systems in which secularists seek a foundation for rights, none can appeal to an external framework that sufficiently establishes those rights’ validity.64 Secularists can practice human rights but cannot explain them, leaving rights vulnerable to redefinition, neglect, or abandonment.

Such problems were vividly illustrated during the French Revolution.65 Even though the early revolutionaries’ Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen located human rights in “the auspices of the Supreme Being,”66 the silence of a nebulous “Being” did not provide a stable foundation for the existence, interpretation, and enforcement of the stated rights. Nor could the revolutionaries’ secularism provide moral content for defining and condemning “harm,” despite the assertation that “Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else.”67 This lack of a moral foundation enabled later revolutionaries to justify guillotining thousands of humans in the name of human rights.68

Conclusion: The Foundation for Human Rights

Secularism cannot account for human rights because it cannot account for the objective human value, dignity, and morality on which these rights depend.

To summarize—Scripture, but not secularism, enables meaningful ethical engagement by providing a foundation for human rights. Secularism cannot account for human rights because it cannot account for the objective human value, dignity, and morality on which these rights depend. Claims to individualistic rights in Western secular culture are thus not only philosophically inconsistent but also practically problematic, excluding society’s most voiceless individuals from human rights. In contrast, a biblical view acknowledges that humans are morally accountable to the Creator whose image humans bear. This image is not based in capability, performance, or capacity, but indelibly stamps the essence of every human. Grounded in the reality of humans’ unchanging Creator, the imago Dei establishes an unshakable foundation for the existence, protection, and application of human rights.

Footnotes

  1. When used in ethics, prima facie (which means “at first appearance”) refers to a standard which is always true by default but which may not be absolute or binding in every conceivable circumstance. For instance, prima facie moral obligations must always be followed unless doing so would irreconcilably conflict with some higher obligation. See Kyle Fedler, Exploring Christian Ethics: Biblical Foundations for Morality (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press), 24–27.
  2. A discussion of why rights are best understood as entitlements, rather than as desires or needs, is available in John Warwick Montgomery, Human Rights and Human Dignity (Dallas, Texas: Probe Books, 1989), 63–69.
  3. Nigel Biggar notes some problems with first arbitrarily assuming, as many secularists do, that human rights are self-existent “givens” and then deriving moral and legal obligations from them rather than beginning with well-founded moral obligations and then deriving human rights from them, as a biblical view does (Nigel Biggar, What’s Wrong with Rights? [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020], 324–334).
  4. Examples are available in Francis Beckwith, Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1993).
  5. Montgomery, Human Rights, 206.
  6. See also Matt Dawson, “Abortion: A Biblical, Biological, and Philosophical Refutation,” Answers Research Journal 12 (January 2019): 13–40, https://answersresearchjournal.org/abortion-refutation/.
  7. See Genesis 2:7, 1:26–29, and 2:15.
  8. E.g., John Calvin, A Commentary on Genesis, trans. John King (London: Banner of Truth Trust, 1965; originally published in Latin in 1554), 93.
  9. C. Ben Mitchell et al., Biotechnology and the Human Good (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2007), 71.
  10. Importantly, dignity is not synonymous with the imago Dei but arises from the image. See C. Ben Mitchell, “The Audacity of the Imago Dei: The Legacy and Uncertain Future of Human Dignity,” in Imago Dei, 109–112.
  11. Although not all rights may entail associated duties (Montgomery, Human Rights, 72–73), many fundamental rights entail corresponding duties (Roger Ruston, Human Rights and the Image of God [London: SCM Press, 2004], 11). Correspondingly, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man notes that “Rights and duties are interrelated in every social and political activity of man” (Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá, Colombia, 1948, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/declaration.asp).
  12. Matthew 5:21–22; Mitchell et al., Biotechnology, 74.
  13. Notably, the James 3:9/Matthew 5:22 obligation to show basic respect for image-bearers does not mean that image-bearers possess a right to never feel offended, especially on account of godly confrontation for wrongs committed. For example, Jesus, the apostles, and other New Testament writers openly condemned (and offended) false teachers (not just false teachings, but the persons directly) who were leading other image-bearers away from God (e.g., Matthew 23:16–33; 2 Peter 2:12–14; Jude 1:11–15). However, these New Testament figures were not pronouncing condemnation arbitrarily or by human authority; rather, they were speaking by the Spirit and authority of God to communicate the condemnation which God had already righteously pronounced. Believers still are called to express God’s truth in grace and love (Ephesians 4:15; Colossians 4:6; 1 Corinthians 16:13–14).
  14. Mitchell et al., Biotechnology, 69–71.
  15. Mitchell et al., Biotechnology, 70.
  16. Mitchell et al., Biotechnology, 70.
  17. These interpretations are not exhaustive, and aspects of different views can certainly overlap.
  18. Stephen Milford, “Substantive or Relational? The Counterfeit Choice in the Imago Dei Debate,” McMaster Journal of Theology and Ministry 20 (2020): 84–117.
  19. Mitchell et al., Biotechnology, 73.
  20. James Smith, You Are What You Love: The Spiritual Power of Habit, ebook ed. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Brazos Press, 2016), chapter 7.
  21. Smith, You Are What You Love.
  22. A necessary, though not sufficient, condition. See Cherney, “Distinctively Human,” 6–27.
  23. E.g., see Revelation 22:9; Hebrews 1:14; Luke 15:10; and 2 Peter 2:4.
  24. E.g., Philip Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, and Religion (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress Press, 1993), 237–240; Karen O’Donnell, “Performing the Imago Dei: Human Enhancement, Artificial Intelligence and Optative Image-Bearing,” International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 18, no. 1 (2018): 4–15.
  25. Evident, for example, in John 1:1–14, which describes the Word as creating “in the beginning” and later being “made flesh.” (See also Steve Ham, “What Is the Image of God?” Answers in Genesis, August 15, 2015, https://answersingenesis.org/genesis/what-is-image-of-god/.) However, this by no means suggests the body is unimportant (Lee Johnson, “Return of the Corporeal Battle: How Second-Century Christology Struggles Inform the Transhumanism Debate,” in Religion and Transhumanism: The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement, eds. Calvin Mercer and Tracy Trothen [Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2015], 273–289).
  26. See Luke 1:41–45, with further commentary available in Scott Rae and Paul Cox, Bioethics: A Christian Approach in a Pluralistic Age (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1999), 136–139.
  27. James Hastings, The Great Texts of the Bible: Genesis to Numbers (Edinburg, Scotland: T&T Clark, 1911), 48; Mitchell et al., Biotechnology, 72. An advocate for functionalism could reply that the concept of dominion is inherent in the imago Dei terminology within the first sentence of Genesis 1:26, with the second sentence merely elaborating where the dominion is to be exercised. However, to then claim that the second sentence proves God’s image consists in dominion would be to beg the question, because the image’s link to dominion had already been presupposed.
  28. A distinction can be drawn between the expression and possession of a trait, as capacities for reason, emotion, and language may be part of humans’ transcendent nature even if individuals cannot always bodily express these capacities. For instance, the Revelation 6:9–11 martyrs exhibited such capacities despite being disembodied.
  29. A similar problem arises from secular “personhood” criteria (Rae and Cox, Bioethics, 168–169).
  30. Mitchell et al., Biotechnology, 73.
  31. Mitchell et al., Biotechnology, 72.
  32. For further clarification, see Ken Ham, “Is Jesus Woke?” Answers in Genesis, November 22, 2021, https://answersingenesis.org/jesus/jesus-woke/.
  33. E.g., Galatians 3:28; Acts 8:26–38; and Revelation 7:9; Mitchell et al., Biotechnology, 70–71.
  34. Tragically, Christians do not always live consistently with biblical principles. However, this does not affect the Bible’s truth. See “Haven’t Christians Done Bad Things?” Answers in Genesis, July 29, 2020, https://answersingenesis.org/blogs/patricia-engler/2020/07/29/havent-christians-done-bad-things/.
  35. E.g., Luke 6:28.
  36. See Philippians 2:5–9.
  37. Still, an appropriate place may exist for seeking the actualization of one’s entitlements; for instance, the martyrs in Revelation 6:9–11 could rightly ask God for vengeance.
  38. Brandon Clay notes, “Throughout the ages, God’s people have understood the fourth commandment in different ways. But the point is that God commanded the ancient Israelites not only to have a day of rest but also to work most of the week” (Brandon Clay, “Why We Work,” Answers in Genesis, June 22, 2021, https://answersingenesis.org/environmental-science/stewardship/why-we-work/).
  39. C.f., Matthew 20:15.
  40. A detailed analysis of rights derived from the Decalogue is available in Walter Harrelson, The Ten Commandments and Human Rights, rev. ed. (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1997).
  41. E.g., Luke 10:25–37; Zechariah 7:9–10; 1 Timothy 5:1–8.
  42. “History of the Declaration,” United Nations, accessed December 2022, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/udhr/history-of-the-declaration.
  43. Rene Cassin, “From the Ten Commandments to the Rights of Man,” in Of Law and Man: Essays in Honor of Haim H. Cohn, ed. Shlomo Shoham (New York: Sabra Books, 1971), 13–14. Cassin concludes, “The Ten Commandments, the first Code of the essential duties of man, have suffered many an outrage in history and continue to suffer. Their moral authority remains intact. The emblem of the Universal Declaration recalls the duty of human fraternity, inspired by that master precept ‘Love thy neighbor as thyself.’ May it partake, despite its purely human origin, of the greatness of the Decalogue and appear as its worthy extension” (Cassin, “From the Ten Commandments,” 25).
  44. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on December 10, 1948, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights.
  45. Cassin, “From the Ten Commandments,” 22–23.
  46. This leads to the problems addressed in Biggar’s What’s Wrong with Rights? along with other issues of secular “rights” discussed below.
  47. Cassin, “From the Ten Commandments,” 14.
  48. Polytheism refers to “many gods” (from poly, “many” and theos, “God”). A secular society of “many gods” results if everyone is equally entitled to the godlike status of being their own authority for truth.
  49. Neither scenario may be fully carried to its logical conclusion in practice, but the theoretical problem remains. Even where aspects of both scenarios may occur at the same time, whoever decides (at least in practice) which rights should be controlled by individuals vs. by agencies is themselves functioning as the authority for determining the right to determine rights, which only sets the basic problem back a step. See Arthur Leff, “Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law,” Duke Law Journal (December 1979): 1246.
  50. Leff, “Unspeakable Ethics.”
  51. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 US 833, (1992) at 851, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/505/833/.
  52. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey.
  53. O. Carter Snead, What It Means to Be Human: The Case for the Body in Public Bioethics (London: Harvard University Press, 2020), 137–170.
  54. E.g., Proverbs 31:8–9; Psalm 82:3–4; and Jeremiah 22:3.
  55. See Georgia Purdom and Jason Lisle, “Morality and the Irrationality of an Evolutionary Worldview,” Answers in Genesis, May 13, 2009, https://answersingenesis.org/morality/morality-and-the-irrationality-of-an-evolutionary-worldview/; Ken Ham and Avery Foley, “Do Secularists Have a Foundation for Morality?” Answers in Genesis, July 12, 2016, https://answersingenesis.org/morality/do-secularists-have-foundation-morality/; H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr., The Foundations of Bioethics, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 37–67.
  56. Engelhardt, The Foundations of Bioethics, 37–67.
  57. Leff, “Unspeakable Ethics,” 1246.
  58. Ruston, Human Rights, 7.
  59. A secular argument to this effect is given in Peter Singer, “All Animals Are Equal,” Philosophic Exchange 1 (1974), reprinted in Ideas and Ideologies: A Reader, eds. Terrence Ball and Richard Dagger (New York: Pearson, 2006), 405–415.
  60. From an evolutionary perspective, applying human rights exclusively to humans could be considered a form of “speciesism,” which the secular ethicist Peter Signer condemns (“All Animals Are Equal”). We could instead, as Singer does, try to ground interspecies “personhood” rights in capacities like self-awareness. But this engenders significant ethical issues similar to those associated with a functional view of the imago Dei. (Besides, would not the grounding of rights in capacities in which humans happen to excel itself be a form of speciesism?) Notably, however, secularism cannot provide the moral content for criticizing speciesism as “wrong” anyway.
  61. This is because humans are always subject to the evolutionary flux from which they supposedly arose. This point also raises problems for theistic evolutionists who view human evolution as ongoing today, because the view that humans lack a unique, unchanging nature means that what God deemed very good about humans must not rest in our nature but in our capacity for change, leaving no basis for respecting humans as we are (Gerald McKenny, “Human Nature and Biotechnological Enhancement: Some Theological Considerations,” Studies in Christian Ethics 32, no. 2 [2019]: 229–240; note that McKenny is also writing from a theistic evolutionary view). Importantly, such views can also accommodate the belief that we should use technology to further “evolve” humanity (e.g., Gerald McKenny, “Evolution, Biotechnology, and the Normative Significance of Created Order,” Toronto Journal of Theology 31, no. 1 [2015]: 15–26). Moreover, the absence of an essential human nature means that the imago Dei cannot be an essential part of human nature, which not only poses the ethical challenges described above but also leads some theistic evolutionists to conclude that the imago Dei is not unique to humans (e.g., Hefner, The Human Factor, 237–240). See also Frost Smith, “Evolution and What the Image of God Is Not,” Answers in Genesis, August 5, 2015, https://answersingenesis.org/are-humans-animals/evolution-and-what-image-god-is-not/.
  62. Eberhard Welty, Handbook of Christian Social Ethics, vol. 1 (Freiburg, Germany: Herder and Herder, 1960), 266–268.
  63. A similar argument is made in Robert Wolff, Understanding Rawls: A Reconstruction and Critique of A Theory of Justice (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), 20.
  64. Montgomery, Human Rights and Human Dignity, 106.
  65. See Francis Shaeffer, How Should We Then Live? (Old Tappan, New Jersey: Revell, 1976), 120–124.
  66. National Assembly of France, Declaration of the Rights of Man, August 26, 1789, available on the website of the Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, accessed December 12, 2022, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp.
  67. National Assembly of France, Declaration of the Rights of Man.
  68. Shaeffer, How Should We Then Live? 120–124.

Newsletter

Get the latest answers emailed to you.

Answers in Genesis is an apologetics ministry, dedicated to helping Christians defend their faith and proclaim the good news of Jesus Christ.

Learn more

  • Customer Service 800.778.3390